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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours. Parties will be referred to as in
the Court below. Appellants will be referred to as plaintiffs, or the State. Respondent, Union Construction
Company, Inc., will be referrP-d to as Union.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from judgment and decree by the
Court in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Adjudging that the Bid Bond of defendant, r nion Construction Company furnished by Lnited States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company in the sum of $8,650.00 should not be
forfeited to the State of "Ctah.
The pleadings and Pretrial Order makes basic disputed issues of fact.
The basic issues of fact set forth by the Pretrial
Order were six in number and were as follows:
1.

.
)

Did the State survey two roads as claimed by
defendant Union Construction Company, Inc.,
and were the stakes for the two roads on the
ground at the time the employees and agents
of rnion Construction Company~ Inc., went
upon the ground for the purpose of making
their bids ·f
If onlY one road was staked, where were the
stakes. upon tl1e ground at the time when the
Union Construction Con1pa.ny·. Inc.., went upon
the ground for the purpose of making its bid1

3.

Did the l nion Construction Cmnpa.ny. Inc.,
make a mistake of faet as to where the road
would be constructed f

4.

1r ~n. did the Union Construction Company
act as a n~asonahly prudent person in making
such 1nistake 1

T
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5.

What amount of damage did plaintiff sustain
as a result of the failure of Union Construction Company to accept its contract~

6.

Did the plaintiff place any stakes upon the
ground after the plans and specifications were
prepared and submitted to the various bidders~

At the time of trial the State stipulated that if the
Bond was not forfeited that it would not attempt to show
any damage whatsoever and that it was an all or nothing
proposition as far as the State was concerned. It would
be entitled to the full amount of the bond, or it would
be entitled to no judgment. R. 22.
The evidence presented by defendant supported the
position which the Pretrial Order outlined.

r~:

I!;

Plaintiff's own witnesses testified that on three separate occasions the road had been staked in the vicinity.
The first staking occurred in 1946. R. 77. The second
staking occurred in 1954. R. 91. The third staking occurred in 1956 and immediately prior to the time that defendants' employees visited the area for the purpose
of examining the terrain so that a bid could be made.
R.87.
Exhibits 9 to 13 are photographs of the area involved
and show stakes being pointed out after the <'omd nwt ion
project was completed which were in place prior to t liP
commencement of the construction project. Th<>~<' ~takP~
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were those which employees of Union mistook for the
proper stakes which marked the course of the highway.
The area was relatively flat where the stake examined by Union placed the road. The unclassified excavation work would have involved the handling of only
loose and relatively soft dirt. Exhibit No. 10 shows that
the course followed by the State in the actual construction of the road placed the road to the north far enough
that it traversed a solid rock ridge extending down into
the valley. The difference between excavation in rock
such as is shown by Exhibit No. 10 and soft earth makes
the material cost difference.
The bid openings at the State occurred on the lOth
of September. After noticing the great difference between the other bids on unclassified excavation and the
bid of Union, the employes of Union becan1e very much
alarmed. They immediately left for the site of the proposed road construction. They examined the site. On
the morning of the 12th of September Union notified
the Road Commission that there had been a mistake 1nade.
Union also, on September 13th, wrote the State that it
could not follow through on its bid. The State then
awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder.
No additional advertising or delays were necessitated as result of the refusal by Union to accept the contract on which they had bid.
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The Findings of Fact by the Court point out that
the difference between the Morrison-Knudsen Company
bid and Union Construction company bid was $35,380.62,
and was primarily the difference between the bid for
unclassified excavation made by Morrison-Knudsen Company and the bid for unclassified excavation made by
Union Construction Company.
The Court found that there were two sets of stakes
in the area, one to the south of where the road actually
was constructed and that the agents of Union mistakenly
followed the stakes that were south of the true stakes.
The Court found that the agents of Union acted
in a reasonable manner, and were not negligent in following the wrong set of stakes; that there was nothing in
the vicinity to indicate and put them on notice that they
were following the wrong set of stakes. The Court further
found that the mistake was an honest mistake and that the
agents of Union believed the stakes they followed were
the true markers of the roadway.
The Court found that the notification by Union of
the mistake occurred prior to the formal offer of contract
made by the State to Union on September 24, 1956.
The Court concluded Union had made a bona fide
mistake of a fundamental character in calculating the bid;
that the mistake was not the result of any negligence on
the part of defendant but was due to the fact that there
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was present in the vicinity where the road was to be constructed two separate sets of stakes, either one of which
defendant could, in the exercise of ordinary care, follow
and believe marked the site of the road to be constructed.
The Court concluded also that the forfeiture should not
be permitted; that to require forfeiture under the facts
and circumstances would be inequitable and unfair and
would create an intolerable burden not required by law.
In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Court entered the Decree that Enion
be permitted to withdraw its bid and that the State return to Union the Bond which had been deposited to
guarantee performance of the bid.
The Statement of Facts set forth in brief of appellant
contains several quotes and references which are most
favorable to it. The evidence to the contrary of that
quoted is contained in the record and is set forth in part
in this Brief.

STATEniEXT OF POIXTS
POINT I
WHERE A MISTAKE IN CALCULATING A BID IS
FUNDAMENTAL IN CHARACTER AND NOT DUE TO
GROSS NEGLIGENCE FORFEITURE OF BID BONDS WILL
NOT BE PERMITTED BY A COURT OF EQUITY.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT UNION WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, BUT MADF
AN HONEST MATERIAL MISTAKE CONCERNING THE
PROPER MARKINGS FOR THE PROPOSED ROADWAY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE A MISTAKE IN CALCULATING A BID IS
FUNDAMENTAL IN CHARACTER AND NOT DUE TO
GROSS NEGLIGENCE FORFEITURE OF BID BONDS WILL
NOT BE PERMITTED BY A COURT OF EQUITY.

Equitable relief will be granted a bidder for public
contract where he has made a material mistake of fact in
the bid which he submitted, and upon the discovery of that
mistake, acts promptly in informing the public authorities
and requesting withdrawal of his bid, or opportunity
to rectify his mistake, particularly where he does so before any formal contract is entered into. This general
rule is without dissent in the cases and has been recognized generally in all areas of the United States.
The trial court, in its memo decision R. 99 relied upon
and quoted the general rule. It cited the Michigan case of
Kutsche v. Ford, 222 Mich. 442, 192 N.W. 714. It quoted
from the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which
reads as follows:
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"Where a mistake is of so fundamental a
character that the minds of the parties have never,
in fact, met, or where an unconscionable advantage
has been gained by mere mistake or misapprehension, and there was no gross negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, either in falling into the error
or in not sooner claiming redress, and no intervening rights have accrued, and the parties may
still be placed in statu quo, equity will interfere
in its discretion, to prevent intolerable injustice."
In the K utsche case the Michigan Supreme Court
examined carefully the proposition that to permit the
bidder to withdraw his bid would cause damage to the
State and result in the public work costing more than it
should, and answered the claim of the State in the following language :
"In the instant case it may be thought that the
school district cannot be said to be placed in statu
quo when it is considered that the building cost
nearly $6,000 more than plaintiff's bid. To place
in statu quo does not mean that one shall profit out
of the mistake of another. It does not appear that
plaintiff's mistake has n1ade the school building
cost more than it otherwise would have cost. The
school district, if placed back where it was before
the bid, loses nothing except what it seeks to gain
out of plaintiff's nlistake. To compel plaintiff to
forfeit his deposit, because of his 1uistake, would
permit the school district to lessen the proper cost
of the school building at the expense of plaintiff,
and that, in equit~~. is no reason at all for refusing
plain tiff relief." Page 717.
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Respondent has examined all of the cases it has
been able to discover which have a bearing on the fundamental proposition argued by the State in its first point,
and can find no support for the state's position. It will
be noted that the State cites no authority for the proposition that the State Road Commission could not permit
the withdrawal of the bid where there has been a material
mistake of fact made by the bidder.
The United States Supreme Court has had an occasion to pass upon the proposition. It set forth the general
rule in the case of Moffatt, Hodgkins, & Clarke Company
v. City of Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 44 L. Ed. 1108, 20 S.
Ct. 957. The opinion dated May 21, 1900 was written by
Mr. Justice McKenna. The case has been cited many
times and has become known as the case of the nearsighted engineer. The near-sighted engineer made two
mistakes in calculating the bid. One mistake involved
writing the figure of 70c as 50c. The other involved writing the sun1 of $15.00 as $1.50. The Supreme Court of
the United States carefully considered the near-sighted
engineer's mistakes and set down the legal principles
which would seem to be applicable to the present set of
facts. The following quotes outline the Court's reasoning:
"There was no doubt of the mistake, and
there was a prompt declaration of it as soon as it
was discovered and before the city had done anything to alter its condition. Indeed, according to
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the testimony of one witness, the clerk of the board
before the mistake was declared by complainanfs
engineer expressed the thought that 50 cents per
cubic yard for earth excavation was too low, and
there was some discussion about it at the time, but
Mr. Aldridge (he was chairman of the board)
said he (the clerk) might as well go on and read it,
as the bid was informal. The reading proceeded,
and subsequently the Board let the work on contract No. 1 to Jones & Son, and accepted complainant's proposals containing the mistakes for the
work on line B, contract No. 2, although complainant protested that there was a mistake in the price
of earth excavation and also in tunnel excavation.
This was inequitable, even though it ·was impelled
by what was supposed to be the commands of the
charter. It offered or forced complainant the
alternative of taking the contract at an unremunerative price, or, the payment of $90,000 as liquidated damages. We do not think such course was
the command of the statute or the board's duty."
"If the defendants are correct in their contention there is absolutely no redress for a bidder for
public work, no matter how aggravated or palpable his blunder. !The moment his proposal is
opened by the executive board he is held as in a
grasp of steel. There is no remedy, no escape.
If, through an error of his clerk, he has agreed to
do work worth $1,000,000 for $10, he n1ust be held
to the strict letter of his contract. while equity
stands by with folded hands and sees hin1 driven
into bankruptcy. The defendants' position admits
of no compromise, no exception, no 1niddle ground.
"These remarks are so apposite and just it
is difficult to add to them. The transactions had
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not reached the degree of a contract - a proposal
and acceptance. Nor was the bid withdrawn or
canceled against the provision of the charter. A
clerical error was discovered in it and declared,
and no question of the error was then made or of
the good faith of complainant."
There are numerous cases which have been decided
since the cases cited herein. One of the most recent is
Puget Sound Painters, Inc. v. The State of Washington,
et al., 45 Wash. 2d 819,278 P. 2d 302. The Supreme Court
of Washington set down the general rule applicable where
a painter made a mistake in calculating its bid in the
following language:

"* * * that equity will relieve against forfeiture of a bid bond, (a) if the bidder acted in good
faith, and (b) without gross negligence, (c) if he
was reasonably prompt in giving notice of the
error in the bid to the other party, (d) if the
bidder will suffer substantial detriment by forfeiture, and (e) if the other party's status has not
greatly changed, and relief from forfeiture will
work no substantial hardship on him."
Apparently, it is the position of appellant that, as
matter of law, Union was grossly negligent and that forfeiture regardless of care or negligence must be required
under the State Road Commission rules and regulations.
The general rule of law recited herein has been the
subject of several annotations and is set forth in the
general text writers. See 59 ALR 827, 80 ALR 586, 107
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ALR 1451, 126 ALR 837. LRA 1915A P. 229, 43 Am. Jur.
805, 81 CJS Section 116, p. 1095.
It is respectfully submitted that the general rule is
where a mistake in calculating a bid is fundamental in
character and not due to gross negligence, forfeiture of
bid bond will not be permitted by a court of equity.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT UNION WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, BUT MADE
AN HONEST MATERIAL MISTAKE CONCERNING THE
PROPER MARKINGS FOR THE PROPOSED ROADWAY.

The trial court specifically found that there were two
sets of stakes on the area over which the roadway was to
pass. The agents of Union mistakenly followed the
southernmost set of stakes and believed at the time they
made their bid that the road was to be constructed over
a relatively smooth loose dirt type of Inaterial, when as an
actual fact the roadway as staked to the north passed
through solid rock and greatly increased the cost of
handling unclassified excavation.
The evidence adequately supports the trial court's
finding. The State's own witnesses testified that the road
had been staked on three different occasions. The pictures taken prior to trial show, without dispute, the existence of stakes to the south of the stakes which marked
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the road as constructed. In addition to the old stakes,
at the time Glenn examined the road area on behalf of
Union he discovered on the banks of the wash a red flag
in line with the old stakes which he was following. The
situation which the evidence discloses was one calculated
to mislead a person examining the area if he became involved with the old stakes on the area.
The Plans and Specifications were picked up from
the State on the 31st day of August, 1956, on
the 2nd of September, 1956, the agents of Union were on
the road project examining the area. Glenn, who examined the area on behalf of Union, testified that he had
in his car, at the site of the project, the Plans and Specifications for the road project; that as he got out to examine the site of the road, the plans were left in his car
(R. 48). Glenn testified that one of the things which was
misleading was the red flag on the bank of the wash in
line with the old stakes. \Vhen questioned about the red
flag one of the engineers at the road project site said:
"Well, I guess I should have pulled it."
The great disparity between the bid of Union Construction Company and the bid of Morrison-Knudsen
Company for the unclassified excavation work demonstrates that Glenn had made a basic miscalculation. The
unclassified excavation item was the only one in which
there was such a wide disparity between the bidders.
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The State did not produce any evidence refuting or
contradicting the testimony of Glenn concerning the basic
mistake which he made in calculating the cost of doing the
unclassified excavation. It did not produce any evidence
refuting or contradicting Glenn concerning the existence
of the red flag and the line of stakes leading to it at the
job site. The Court accepted the testimony of Union's
witnesses and found that there had been a material mistake made which was without negligence on the part of
Union and that the equitable powers of the Court required
it to relieve Union of the forfeiture required by the State
Road Commission Rules and Regulations.
The State was not damaged in any way. The evidence reveals that Union employees became alarmed
immediately following the bid opening and proceeded
back to the road project site to re-examine the area to
ascertain if there had been some kind of a mistake. The
bid openings were on the lOth of Septen1ber. Glenn was
back at the job site on the 11th of September. The nlorning of the 12th of September, a call ·was 1nade by ~Irs.
Glenn to the State Road Com1nission, and it was informed
that there had been a 1nistake. That the Union Construction Company desired to withdraw its bid. On September
13th, a letter was written to the Co1nn1ission by Counsel
for Respondent informing the Conunission of the 1nistake,
outlining the nature of the mistake, and notifying the
Commission that Union would not be able to sign a contract and undertake the work for the bid price. The
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Commission re-awarded the bid to Morrison-Knudsen
Company and the project was actually constructed.
There is no dispute concerning the unequivocal withdrawal of the bid by Union upon discovering the mistake
which it had made. The second leg of the general rule
quoted herein under Point I was thus complied with.
Prompt notification of the mistake was given. The State
of Utah suffered no damage by reason of the fact that
Union had made a mistake in calculating the bid.
The State, in its brief, claims that Glenn did not take
the plans to the site of the job when he examined it on
the first occasion, prior to the making of the bid. This,
as has been demonstrated, is not so. The Plans and
specifications were in his car and he had had an opportunity to examine them before going to the site to examine the roadway itself.
The evidence is clear that where there is a discrepancy between plans and the road as staked, the actual
staking on the physical site must be the determinative
factor in making the bid.
Glenn had had many years of experience in making
construction bids. The area over which the road was
constructed, as demonstrated by the pictures, was an area
covered with sage brush, cheat grass, russian thistle and
other types of vegetation. All of these facts, the Court
could well consider, in determining that Glenn was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
negligent in following the wrong set of stakes when he
examined the site for the road construction work.
Respondent is unable to find any evidence which
would justify a claim that, as matter of law, respondent
Union and its employees were negligent.
The mistake was made, and it is respectfully submitted, as a practical matter, it is conceded, it was a
material mistake and would justify the Court in exercising its equitable powers and ordering the return of the
Bond to Union.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Union was not negligent but made an honest material mistake concerning the
site of the proposed road.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should
affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree as made by the trial court and dismiss the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT \V. HrGHES
Counsel for Respondent
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